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Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act:
Ownership of Soviet Foreign Trade
Organizations
By JAMEs STANG
Member of the Class of 1980

I. INTRODUCTION
In response to statements appearing in the Soviet press,' Alexander Yessenin-Volpin, a Soviet dissident residing in the United States,

commenced a libel action against TASS Agency,3 Novosti Press
Agency, 4 and the Daily World5 in New York State Supreme Court.
TASS removed the action to federal court and, with Novosti, obtained
an order dismissing the suit.6 The court based its order on the Foreign

Sovereign Immunities Act,' which grants sovereign immunity to foreign states sued in American courts. A principal issue before the court
1. Five allegedly libelous articles appeared in Soviet publications between February
and June of 1976. The articles contained responses to charges made by the Western press
that the Soviet Union employed psychiatric methods to silence its dissidents. The articles
attempted to rebut the charges by alleging that the dissident psychiatric "patients" were
truly mentally ill, as evidenced by their need for psychiatric treatment after their immigration to the West. The following is an excerpt from one of the articles:
Yessenin-Volpin, once so ardently defended by the Western press, prior to his departure from the USSR had been eight times in a psychiatric hospital. During the
last war he was relieved from military service due to illness. Received a pension
and enjoyed all the benefits accorded to mentally sick persons in the USSR. For
the ninth time he found himself in such a clinic already in the West-in Rome.
Now he is cared for by U.S. psychiatrists.
Krasnaya Zvezda, Feb. 12, 1976. The quotation is reproduced in Exhibit B, Complaint;
Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agcy., 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
2. Alexander Yessenin-Volpin was a Soviet dissident who immigrated to the United
States in 1972. While Volpin lived in the Soviet Union, he was active in opposing psychiatric abuses against fellow dissidents. Complaint; Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agcy, 443
F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
3. TASS is the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union of the USSR Council of Ministers. Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agcy., 443 F. Supp. 849, 852 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
4. Novosti Press Agency is an information agency of Soviet public organizations, Id.
5. The Daily World is the newspaper of the American Communist Party, Id. at 851.
6. Id. at 851, 856-57.
7. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (1976).
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was the interpretation of the term "foreign state."' 8 The court's definition of the phrase directly conflicted with the interpretation followed in
the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia,9 enunciated
only three months earlier.
The purpose of this note is to compare and contrast the United
States' judicial interpretations of the term "foreign state" in relation to
entities created by Eastern European socialist governments. The discussion will include a brief survey of the United States' law of sovereign immunity and will apply a recommended interpretation of the
term "foreign state" to Soviet foreign trade organizations operating in
the United States.
II. THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
A.

Sovereign Immunity: History

Sovereign immunity is a principle of international law which provides for immunity from the exercise of jurisdiction by another state to
enforce the latter's rules of law.' 0 In the early stages of the doctrine's
development, sovereign immunity applied to all state actions.II The
underlying rationale for the blanket protection was the belief that the
king could do no wrong.12 This absolute immunity is known as the
absolute theory of sovereign immunity. 3 Governmental expansion
into traditionally non-governmental areas such as commercial trading,
manufacturing, and shipping marked the decline of the absolute
view.' 4 Absolute immunity made the state a disfavored trading partner
because it gave the state the power to abrogate its agreements with impunity. 5 Although political and economic pressures restrained flagrant
abuses of this power, the private trader assumed a substantial risk of
having no legal means to resolve disputes with a state party.
As an accommodation to their commercial pursuits, states developed a restricted approach to sovereign immunity. The restrictive the8. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a)-(b) (1976).
9. Edlow Intern. v. Nuklearna Elektrarna KRSKO, 441 F. Supp. 827, 831-32 (D.D.C.
1977).
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 65 (1965).

11. 45 AM. JuR. 2d InternationalLaw § 47 (1969).
12. Setser, The Immunities of the State and Government Economic 4ctivities, 24 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 291, 294 (1959).

13. Annot., 25 A.L.R. 3d 322, 332 (1969).
14. Id. at 335.
15. Berman, The Legal Framework of Trade Between Planned and Market Economics:
The Soviet-American Example, 24 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 482, 485 (1959).
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ory distinguishes between state action that is governmental in nature
(jure imperil) and action that is commercial in nature (fitre gestionis).6
State action that is jure gestionis is not protected by sovereign immunity. Under the restrictive theory, state traders are on an equal legal
footing with private parties and thereby have greater access to commercial opportunities. The modem rationale for the doctrine of sovereign
immunity is derived from standards of public morality, fair dealing,
reciprocal self-interest,
and respect for the power and dignity of the
17
foreign sovereign.
The American law of sovereign immunity is codified in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (hereinafter the Act). Before passage of
the legislation in 1976, the prevailing procedure for asserting a sovereign immunity defense was to file a claim of immunity with the State
Department. 18 The Department would give both parties an opportunity to present their arguments to its legal advisor in an informal setting. If the Department denied the claim of immunity, it would so
inform the parties. If the Department recognized the validity of the
immunity defense, it communicated a recommendation of immunity to
the trial court through the Attorney General.' 9
In Exparte Peru,2" the Supreme Court ruled that the judiciary
must "accept and follow" the executive branch's approval of a sovereign immunity claim.2 The Court reasoned that a grant or denial of
immunity would have a significant impact on American foreign relations and that the decision was better left to the political branch of the
government.2" In the absence of an executive recommendation, the
courts could decide the issue of sovereign immunity "in conformity
with the [Department of State's] principles."'
Congress, in passing the Act, rejected the Supreme Court's charac16. Supra note 14.
17. National Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 362 (1954).
18. This procedure was used in the first case decided by the Supreme Court involving
sovereign immunity. The Schooner Exchange v. M'Fadden & Others, II U.S. (7 Cranch)
116, 117-19 (1812).
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 71, Reporters' Notes no. 1 (1965). Between 1960 and 1972, the State Department received
fifty requests for immunity recommendations. Jurisdictionof United States Courts in Suits
against ForeignStates- Hearingson H..I11315 Before the Subcommittee on ldministrative
Law and Governmental Relations ofthe Committee ofthe Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 32
(1976) (statement of Monroe Leigh).
20. Exparte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
21. Id. at 588.
22. Id. at 588-89.
23. Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34-35 (1945).
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terization of the immunity question as a political problem within the
authority of the executive branch of the government. 24 The Act transfers responsibility for deciding sovereign immunity claims from the Department of State to the judiciary because Congress believed that the
claims are best adjudicated by the courts "on the basis of a statutory
regime which incorporates standards recognized under international
law."' 25 The role of the Department of State is limited to appearances
as amicus curiae in cases of governmental interest.26
Although Congress rejected the Department of State as the proper
arbiter of immunity claims, it approved the Department's application
of the restrictive theory to those claims.27 The Act, in principle, emStates
braces the Department of State's approach 28 and brings United
29
law into conformity with the law of the world community.
B.

The Act

The general rule of sovereign immunity under the Act is that all
disputes involving "foreign state" defendants are beyond the scope of
federal and state courts' subject matter jurisdiction. 30 This rule is based
on the proposition that all "foreign states" are entitled to claim sovereign immunity. The statute sets out five types of disputes involving a
"foreign state" that are within the courts' subject matter jurisdiction.
These categories are exceptions
to the Act's presumption of a "foreign
31
state's" sovereign immunity.
A plaintiff alleging the court's subject matter jurisdiction under the
Act must satisfy two requirements. First, the plaintiff must establish
that the defendant is a "foreign state". This point of proof alone is not
sufficient to invoke the court's subject matter jurisdiction because "for24. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976). The Department of State's position also conflicted with the
Court's characterization. Monroe Leigh, Legal Advisor of the Department of State, testified
before a House Subcommittee that "it (the Department of State) is in the incongruous position of a political institution trying to apply a legal standard to litigation already before the
courts." Hearingson H.R. 11315, supra note 19, at 26.
25. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1976).
26. 75 DEP'T STATE BULL. 649-50 (1976).
27. The Department of State adopted the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in
1952. 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984, 984-85.
28. Hearings,supra note 19, at 37.
29. H.R. REP., supra note 25, at 17.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976).
31. Exceptions to the grant of sovereign immunity exist in any case in which (1)the
"foreign state" waived its immunity; (2) the action is based on a commercial act affecting the
United States; (3) rights to certain kinds of property are in issue; (4) the "foreign state"
committed torts specified in the statute and (5) a maritime lien is enforced against the vessel
or cargo of a foreign state." 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)-(b) (1976).
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eign states" are, as a general rule, immune from the court's jurisdiction.
The plaintiff must establish further that the controversy is a dispute
falling within one of the statutory exceptions to the "foreign state's"
immunity, and thereby that it is a dispute within the court's jurisdiction.
A defendant can challenge a jurisdictional allegation based on the
Act under two approaches. First, a defendant can challenge the subject
matter jurisdiction allegation by establishing that he is not a "foreign
state." If the defendant is not a "foreign state", the court must dismiss
the action because the Act's jurisdictional grant extends only to "foreign states."
Second, a defendant can attack the jurisdictional allegation by
pleading a claim of sovereign immunity. The defendant must establish
two points to invoke the immunity. He must prove that he is a "foreign
state." This issue should not be a matter of dispute between the parties
because the allegation is as essential to the plaintiff's position as it is to
the defendant's stance. In addition, the defendant must establish that
the dispute does not fall within any of the controversies which are exceptions to the sovereign immunity claim because cases within the exceptions are within the court's jurisdiction.
Every plaintiff in an action brought under the Act must consider
whether his opponent is a "foreign state." A defendant wishing to challenge the allegation of jurisdiction must first determine whether he is a
"foreign state." The plaintiff and, on occasion, the defendant will have
to prove additional allegations to satisfy or thwart the statute's jurisdictional grant, but both begin with the "foreign state" issue. Thus, the
definition of "foreign state" is of importance to litigants in an action
under the Act.
"Foreign state" is defined in section 1603(a) of the Act as including a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality thereof. An entity is an agency or instrumentality if (1) it is a
separate legal person; (2) a majority of its shares or other ownership
interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision and (3) it is
not a citizen of a state of the United States.32
The first criterion, separate legal personality, is satisfied by any
entity that can sue or be sued in its own name, contract in its own name
or hold property in its own name. 3 The legal capacity of a foreign
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a)-(b) (1976).
33. H.R. REP., supra note 25, at 15.
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entity is determined by the substantive law of the chartering state. 4
The third criterion, non-citizenship, is self-explanatory. The courts
have had no difficulty in applying these components of the definition of
"foreign state."
By contrast, the second criterion, ascertainment of the agency's or
instrumentality's owner, is the source of substantial controversy between the federal courts in the Southern District of New York and the
District of Columbia. Particular difficulties arise in cases involving so35
cialist state enterprises. As a rule, the enterprises do not issue stock.
The courts must inquire into the ownership of the enterprises' assets to
identify the holder of the majority interest. One noted commentator
has recognized the difficulties an American judge may encounter in
such an inquiry:
The Western judge cannot help bringing . . . the terminology and
the habits of mind appropriate to viewing a corporation which functions in the orthodox environment of a market economy. But the
results of his decision would be unbalanced if he inflexibly applied
his own law as well. The conceptual tools of the lexfori are unlikely
to be equal to the task.3 6
Nonetheless, the courts must bear the responsibility of determining the
owners of the socialist enterprise.37
I1.

INTERPRETATION OF THE ACT

American courts have analyzed the ownership interest of socialist
governments in socialist legal persons in the following cases: Federal
Republic of Germany v. Elcofon (East Germany, 1972), as Edlow Inter
nationalCo. v. NuklearnaElektrarnaKRSKO (Yugoslavia, 1977), 39and
Yessenin-Volpin v. NovostiPressAgency (Soviet Union, 1978).40 In the
cases involving the Soviet Union (Volpin) and Yugoslavia (Edlo;v), the
courts' analysis focused on the ownership issue as stated in the Act's
definition of "foreign state" because the motions before the courts were
based on the Act. The East German case (Elicofon) predated passage
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§§

297, 298 (1971).

35. Hazard, Soviet Government Corporations,41 MICH. L. REV. 850, 858 (1943).
36. S. PISAR, COEXISTENCE AND COMMERCE: GUIDELINES FOR TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST 457 (1970).
37. H.R. REPORT, supra note 25, at 28. This statement concerned the judiciary's responsibilities in applying the attachment provisions of the Act; however, it also holds true
for applying the Act's definition section.
38. Federal Republic of Germany v. Elicofon, 358 F. Supp. 747 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
39. Edlow Intern. v. Nukleama Elektrarna KRSKO, 441 F. Supp. 827 (D.D.C. 1977).
40. Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agcy, 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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of the Act but the issue before the court, the relationship between the
state and the legal entity, was identical to the issue in the two subsequent decisions.
A.

Federal Republic of Germany v. Eicofon

In Elicofon, the West German Government and several of its citizens sued Elicofon, an American citizen, for recovery of two portraits41
by Albrecht Diierer.42 The paintings disappeared from a German art
museum during the American occupation in 1945. The Weimar Art
Collection (WAC), an East German legal person, moved to intervene in
the original action and filed a separate suit against Elicofon for possession of the portraits. The German parties opposed the WAC's intervention motion and Elicofon moved to dismiss the WAC's complaint for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the WAC was an
instrumentality of a government not afforded recognition by the UNited
States.
The WAC maintained that American nonrecognition of East Germany was irrelevant to its legal rights for two reasons. First, a 1923
American-German treaty granted German corporations and associations standing to sue in American courts. 4 3 Second, the WAC possessed
a legal personality separate from East Germany.
The court dismissed the WAC's motion to intervene in the original
action and its complaint against Elicofon. The court rejected the treaty
theory because enforcement of the treaty's provisions would "be highly
inconsistent with expressly formulated national policy"" on the status
of East Germany. The court rejected the separate personality argument on two grounds. First, creation of a separate personality for the
WAC did not alter the museum's governmental function. The court
concluded that the WAC was, prior to its incorporation, "performing a
governmental function as an arm and agency of the GDR [German
41. The subjects of the paintings were Hans and Felicitas Teicher. Federal Republic of
Germany v. Elicofon, 358 F. Supp. 747, 748-49 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
42. Albrecht Dilerer (1471-1528) was a German artist and is considered the first northern European artist to combine Italian Renaissance ideas and forms with the late Gothic art
of the North. Duerer is best known for his prints. Duerer's contributions to the techniques
of woodcut and engraving, as well as his imagery, opened up new realms to graphic artists,
and his pursuit of theoretical understanding altered the course of Northern European art. 9
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 489 (1970); E. PANOVSKY, THE LIFE AND ART OF ALBRECHT D5ERER (4th ed. 1955).
43. The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights, Dec. 8, 1923, United
States-Germany, art. VII, 44 Stat. 2132 (1925-27), T.S. No. 25.
44. Federal Republic of Germany v. Elicofon, 358 F. Supp. 747, 757 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
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Democratic Republic]." 45 The court cited the WAC's trusteeship over
nationally owned property and the governmental bureaucracy directing
the WAC's operations in support of its finding that East Germany's
grant of legal personality did not affect the museum's relationship with
the Government. Thus, the court rejected the separate personality argument because it did not believe that the grant of personality created a
substantive change in the museum's operations.
Second, recognition of the WAC's separate personality would derogate from United States foreign policy. United States nonrecognition
of East Germany has the effect of denying East Germany standing to
sue in American courts. The Elicofon litigation began on January 27,
1969. East German authorities issued the WAC charter on April 14,
19.69 and made it retroactive to January 1, 1969.46 The court found
that the grant of retroactive effect was designed to serve as the basis for
a separate personality argument and thereby avoid East Germany's
standing problems. The court would not grant the East German Government, thinly disguised as an art museum, access to American courts
and, as a result, create a conflict with United States foreign policy.
Elicofon is not direct authority for interpreting the Act's definition
of "foreign state" because the decision preceded passage of the statute.
In addition, the court does not identify the decisive reason for rejecting
the legal personality argument. The first ground for the decision is
based on an analysis of the entity-government relationship. This approach is relevant to a state's ownership interest in a separate entity,
and the definition of "foreign state." The second ground, the effect of
recognition of WAC's separate personality on United States foreign
policy, does not bear on the relationship between the legal person and
the state. Each reason could independently support the court's holding.
Elicofon cannot be used as authority supporting a particular approach
to defining "foreign state" because the court does not identify the controlling ground for its decision.
Elicofon is important because it was the first judicial discussion of
the relationship between a socialist government and an entity chartered
under its laws. Years later, two district courts would rely upon different aspects of the first ground, the function of the entity and its property rights in its assets, to determine the applicability of the Act to
socialist state enterprises.
45. Id. at 756.
46. Id. at 753.
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B.

Edlow International Co. v. Nuklearna Elektrarna KRSKO

In December 1977, the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia decided Edlow v. Nuklearna Elektrarna KRSKO
(Edlow).47 Edlow was the first decision after passage of the Act to state
a test for determining ownership of a socialist enterprise. Edlow International, a Bermuda corporation, brought an action against Nuklearna
Elektrarna (NEK), a Yugoslav work organization, to recover brokerage
fees it earned in the sale of nuclear fuel to the enterprise. Edlow
pleaded subject matter jurisdiction under the Act alleging that NEK
was a "foreign state" and that the transaction fell within a statutory
exception to the Act's general grant of immunity. NEK moved to dismiss the complaint for lack ofjurisdiction because it was not a "foreign
state" as defined in section 1603. as The parties agreed that NEK was
not a citizen of a state of the United States and that it was a legal person. The parties' dispute focused on Yugoslavia's ownership interest in
NEK.
In defense of the Act's applicability, Edlow argued that socialist
states own and control all property within their territories and, therefore, Yugoslavia owned and controlled NEK. NEK responded that
Edlow misunderstood the state's ownership interest in the enterprise's
assets. NEK's property was social, rather than state property and NEK
held and used it in trust for the Yugoslav people. NEK concluded that
the Yugoslav state did not have any property rights in NEK and that
the second criterion of the definition of "foreign state" was not satisfied.
The court rejected Edlow's argument and dismissed the complaint
against NEK for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Under Edlow's
"property-owngship" approach, the court reasoned, all socialist enterprises would fall within the definition of "foreign state"-a result contrary to congressional intent.49 As an alternative to the "propertyownership" analysis, the court proposed a two-prong test to determine
the enterprise's status as a "foreign state" and the Act's applicability to
the legal person. In the first phase of its inquiry the court would examine the degree to which the legal person discharged a governmental
function and in the second phase, the extent of state control over the
enterprise's operations.5" If the state exerted a strong influence on
47.
48.
49.
1977).
50.

Edlow Intern. v. Nuklearna Elektrarna KRSKO, 441 F. Supp. 827 (D.D.C. 1977).
See generally text of I.B.
Edlow Intern. v. Nuklearna Elektrarna KRSKO, 441 F. Supp. 827, 831-32 (D.D.C.
Id. at 832.
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those two aspects of the enterprise's existence, the court would find that
the state held a majority ownership interest in the enterprise.
In its discussion of the first prong of the test, the Edlow court relied on the distinction between government and the private sector as it
exists in the United States to determine whether NEK exercised a governmental function. The court found that Yugoslav work organizations fulfill a purpose comparable to that undertaken by private
corporations in the United States such as production and enterprise. It
concluded that therefore NEK was not engaged in a governmental
function.
Apart from the question of the soundness of the court's focus on
the enterprise's function, the court's standard for distinguishing between governmental and private purposes is open to criticism. First,
the court took the erroneous position, discussed previously, of applying
domestic preconceptions to a foreign situation.-" The government's
role in Yugoslavia, or in socialist countries in general, is different from
its role in the United States. To the extent the countries' political experiences are dissimilar, the Edlow court's standard adjudicates the
rights of a Yugoslav enterprise on an inappropriate standard.
Second, the dichotomy between government and private industry
in the United States is not clear. Increasingly, governmental agencies
operate in areas once considered the domain of private industry. The
blurring of the distinction between the two sectors makes application of
the test rely inordinately on the political and economic preconceptions
of the trial judge. The rights of a foreign enterprise should not be subject to such unpredictable and subjective considerations.
In the discussion of the second prong, its test for state ownership of
a legal person, the Edlow court considered whether the state exerts sufficient control over the enterprise's operation to render meaningless the
state-enterprise distinction. The standard used to determine the requisite degree of state control is whether the government controls the detailed physical performance of the enterprise.- 2 The court derived this
standard from two Supreme Court cases, UnitedStates v. Orleans" and
Logue v. UnitedStates.54 These cases, brought under the Federal Tort
Claims Act,55 decided the question of what is an agency or instrumen51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See text accompanying footnote 36.
Edlow Intern. v. Nuklearna Elektrarna KRSKO, 441 F. Supp. 827, 832 (1977).
United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807 (1976).
Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521 (1973).
Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 646, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976).
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tality of the Federal Government, an issue analogous to that before the
Edlow court.
In Logue, a Texas county jail contracted with the Federal Government's Bureau of Prisons to provide for the safekeeping, care and subsistence of federal prisoners. Logue, a federal arrestee assigned to the
care of a federal marshall, committed suicide while incarcerated in the
county jail. His parents sued the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims Act for the death of their son, alleging negligent supervision by
his county jailers.
The Federal Tort Claims Act extends liability to the United States
for the negligent acts of its employees.56 The immediate question
before the Court was whether the county jailer was an employee of the
Federal Government. This determination turned on whether the jail,
the immediate employer of the alleged tortfeasor, was an agency or
instrumentality of the Federal Government.
The Court held that the United States was not liable for Logue's
57
death. The Court, relying on common-law principles of agency,
found that the county jail was an independent contractor with the Government and was not its agent or instrumentality.
The Court defined the relationship between the government and
the governmental agency according to a modification of the traditional
formulation of the employer-employee relationship.58 The Court held
that a finding that the jail was the Federal Government's agent or instrumentality would require that the employer (the Federal Government) have the right to control the detailed physical performance of the
employee servant (the county jail). The Court noted that the federal
deputy assigned to Logue lacked any power or authority to control the
jail's internal operations. The Court also held that the terms of the
contract between the Bureau of Prisons and the county jail anticipated
the jail's control of its own daily functions. The Supreme Court held
that the United States did not have direct physical control over the
county jail, basing its decision on the facts and circumstances surrounding the jail's daily operations.
The Edlow court cited a second Supreme Court case, UnitedStates
v. Orleans,in support of its standard for determining the degree of state
control necessary to characterize an enterprise as a governmental
56. Id. § 1346(b).
57. Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 527 (1973).
58. A master is a principal who employs a servant, an agent, and who has the right to
control the physical conduct of the servant in the performance of his duties. REsTATEMENr
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(1) (1958).

Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review

[Vol. 3

agency or instrumentality. Orleansdiscussed the question of what is an
agency or instrumentality of the Federal Government, an issue identical to the question in Logue and analogous to the inquiry in Edlo.
In Orleans, the Warren-Trumbull Council, a community action
agency authorized by the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964,- 9 sponsored a recreational outing for a group of children and hired private
transportation to drive some of them to the outing site. One private
vehicle collided with a truck, injuring one of the children. The child
and his father sued the United States for the child's injuries under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging that the Council was a governmental
agency and that it negligently organized and supervised the excursion.
The issue before the Court was whether the Council was an agency or
instrumentality of the United States.60
The Court rejected the Orleans' claim, holding that the Council
was an independent contractor with the Government. The Court reaffirmed the Logue standard, "A critical element in distinguishing an
agency from a contractor is the power of the Federal Government 'to
control the detailed physical performance of the contractor.' "61 The
Court's discussion identified a number of characteristics of the government-entity relationship that are not sufficient, alone or in the aggregate, to constitute government control of the entity's detailed physical
performance. First, exclusive federal funding of the entity's operations
does not make the entity a federal agency.62 Control of the purse-strings often results in control of the organization. The Court held, however, that a conditional grant of funds does not necessarily alter the
basic relationship between the federal government and the local governments and their entities.63
A second characteristic of the government-entity relationship that
will not support a finding that the entity is a federal instrumentality is
the existence of federal regulations and guidelines for the entity's utilization of government funds. 64 The Community Services Administra59. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, title II, § 201, 42 U.S.C. § 2781 (1976).
60. United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 810-11 (1976).
61. Id. at 814.
62. Id. at 815.
63. The condition in the grant can have a significant controlling effect on the grant
recipient without affecting the non-agency character of the government-entity relationship.
In Orleans,one condition of continued federal support was the reorganization of the Council and the selection of a new Council chairman. The Supreme Court upheld the District
Court's finding that the condition did not warrant the conclusion that the Council was a
federal agency or instrumentality. United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 816 and n,6
(1976).
64. Id. at 815.
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tion is the federal agency administering the Economic Opportunity
Act 65 and it issues regulations governing groups like the Council."
The Administration's regulations67 are extensive and include "employment policies and procedures, lobbying limitations, accounting and inspection procedures, expenditure limitations and programmatic
limitations and application procedures." 68 The Court explained that
the purpose of these regulations was to assure proper utilization of the
federal grant. The justices did not believe the regulations gave the Administration the power to supervise the Council's daily operations.
The Court examined the managerial aspects of the Economic Opportunity Act's programs and found that Congress did not intend organizations similar to the Council to become federal agencies. 69 The
Court considered the regulation that an Administration employee
could not serve on the Council's governing board.70 The Court stated
that the statutory mandate that the board be comprised of representatives of local interest groups was indicative of the community and not
of the federal nature of the Council.
The Edlow court 7 ' relied on the cases discussed above in identifying a number of factors relevant to the application of the "control"
aspect of the test that determined the socialist government's ownership
interest in its separate legal persons. The three considerations noted by
the court were: first, the state regulation of assets and enterprise dissolution and liquidation; second, state subsidization of enterprise opera72
tions; and third, a state presence on the enterprise's governing board.
The cases cited by the Edlow court discounted the importance of state
financial assistance and some aspects of state regulation of an entity's
operations.
The remaining factor that the Edlow court considered in the "control" aspect of the test was the state's participation on the entity's managing board. The Orleans and Logue courts considered this factor in
their analyses and attached great significance to it in concluding
whether an agency relationship existed. The role of the state in the
65. 42 U.S.C. § 2941 (1976).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 2942(n) (1976).
67. 45 C.F.R. §§ 1005.1-1078.1-7 (1978).
68.
69.
discern
cies by
70.

United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 817-18 (1976).
The Court also examined the legislative history of the Economic Opportunity Act to
Congress' intent and opined that Congress did not intend to create new federal agenauthorizing Council-like organizations. Id. at 817.
45 C.F.R. 1015.735-1019 (1978).

71. 42 U.S.C. § 2791(b)-(c) (1976).
72. Edlow Intern. v. Nuklearna Elektrarna KRSKO, 441 F. Supp. 827, 832 (1977).
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managerial aspect of the enterprise's operations has greater judicial
support as an indicia of control than do the other two factors. Thus,
the state's managerial role should be given greatest emphasis in determining the state's control over the detailed physical performance of socialist entities.
C. Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency
Three months after the Edlow court prescribed the "function-control" approach to analyzing a state's ownership interest in a legal person, the District Court for the Southern District of New York adopted
a contrary test for ownership in Yessenin- Volpin No vosti PressAgency
(Voopin). 7 3 Volpin was a libel action against two Soviet organizations,
TASS and Novosti Press Agency, and the American Communist
Party's newspaper, the Daily World. After the case was removed from
New York state court to the federal district court, the Soviet parties
moved to dismiss the actions under a claim of immunity based on the
Act. The court ordered a dismissal of the complaint against the Soviet
movants because the court found that they fell within the Act's grant of
sovereign immunity which deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction.
Before the court applied the Act to the Soviet defendants, it discussed the preliminary issue of whether the movants fell within the
Act's definition of "foreign state." The court's analysis focused on
Novosti's status because the parties stipulated to TASS' immunity
under the Act. The plaintiff agreed that Novosti satisfied two of the
three requirements that together define "foreign state." Novosti was a
separate legal person and was not a citizen of a state of the United
States. The Plaintiff disputed Novosti's contention that the Soviet state
held a majority ownership interest in Novosti.
The court determined that Novosti was a "foreign state" because
the Soviet state owned 63 percent of its assets. 74 The court granted
Novosti's claim of sovereign immunity because it determined that the
publication of the alleged libel did not fall within any of the statutory
exceptions to the grant of immunity. 75
'.

0

73. Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agcy., 443 F. Supp. 849 (1978).
74. The court explained that Congress intended that the state ownership criterion be a
means of establishing the identity of the state with the enterprise. Although the court noted
that a property ownership analysis was not analytically useful in the context of socialist
state'-enterprise relations, it nonetheless applied that approach in its examination of the
state's interest in Novosti's assets. Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agcy., 443 F. Supp,
849, 852-54 (1978).
75. A second ground for the court's decision was its finding that Novosti was an organ
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An analysis of the Soviet Union's ownership of Novosti's assets

begins with the Constitution of the U.S.S.R.:
Article 10. The foundation of the economic system of the
USSR is socialist ownership of the means of production in the form
of state property (belonging to all the people) ....
Socialist ownership... embraces the property of public organizations which they
require to carry out their purposes under their rules.
Article 11. State property, i.e., the common property of the Soviet people, is the principal form of socialist property76

At first glance, this constitutional provision apparently vests in the state
all proprietary rights to Novosti and its assets. However, Soviet Marxist-Leninist doctrine complicates that otherwise simple solution to the
problem of identifying Novosti's owner. Soviet Marxism-Leninism distinguishes between property rights in the legal sense and property
rights in the economic sense." The Constitution of the U.S.S.R. identifies the legal property owner, the state. The economic property owner
is the legal person, i.e. a state production enterprise, to whom the state
distributes its property for fulfillment of production goals.78
The distinction between the legal and economic property owner is
drawn in Professor Harold Berman's Justice in the U.S.S.R.," on
which the Volpin court relied in its property-ownership analysis. Professor Berman states that the enterprise and the state simultaneously
enjoy the rights of possession, use and disposition over the assets allocated to the entity8 0 The state enjoys these rights as the legal owner of
of the Soviet state. The court based its finding on George Guins' book, SovwET LAW AND
SovIET SociETY (1954). Guins' thesis is that Marxism is a demoralizing and reactionary
system that attacks legal institutions, e.g. property rights, which are deeply rooted in human
nature. The work depicts American-Soviet tensions as a struggle of personal freedom
against tyranny. Against this background, Guins describes Soviet society as a monolithic
structure whose subparts are subservient to the will of the state. He cites two Soviet arbitration decisions from the late 1930's to illustrate the close nexus between the state and prod uction enterprises. However, the significant legal and economic reforms of the post-Stalinist
period have made those decisions historic curiosities.
The Volpin court's reliance on Guins' work as an analysis of present day Soviet Society
is subject to serious -question. Soviet Law and Soviet Society reflects the highly emotionalized attitudes of the Cold War era and the book's readers should consider the consequent
possibility of distortion. In addition, its citations in support of the portion used by the court
are outdated and irrelevant to contemporary Soviet conditions.
76. KONSTrrtim (Constitution) arts. 10 and 11 (U.S.S.R.).
77. Cf. H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R. 114-16 (1963); Bajt, Property in Capital
and in the Means ofProduction in Socialist Economics, 11 THE J. OF L. & EcON. I (1968).
78. Bajt, supra note 77.
79. H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R. (1963).
80. Id. at 115.
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the property and the enterprise enjoys them as the holder of particular
"economic-administrative" functions (emphasis added).' Soviet legislation 82 attempts to accomodate these competing rights by circumscribing the state's ability to assert its ownership rights and by giving the
enterprise substantive authority over its assets.
The Volpin court confronted this system of dual ownership when it
tried to apply the state ownership provisions of the Act. The court had
two choices in interpreting ownership. It could rely on the Soviet Constitution and the state's status as legal property owner as grounds for
holding that the Soviet state owned Novosti and its assets. Alternatively, the court could examine the extent of the enterprise's economic
property rights to determine whether the entity operated with sufficient
independence to distinguish it from the state bureaucracy.
The court interpreted ownership under the Act as legal, rather
than economic, ownership. This result conflicts with the court's own
statements in the opinion and with the conclusion of its own authority,
Professor Berman. The court indicated in the beginning of its discussion that the purpose of the ownership test was to measure the extent to
which the enterprise could be identified with the state.8 3 The only realistic way of accurately understanding their relationship is to examine
how the enterprise and state actually interact. The legal ownership approach rejects this method and favors theoretical descriptions of the
system's operations over the actual interrelationships between the state
and the entity.
The court's adoption of the legal ownership test also conflicts with
Professor Berman's depiction of Soviet economic reality. "The basis of
Soviet Socialism is over-all integrated planning, and that such planning
is compatible with, and in fact has required, important modifications of
the doctrine of absolute ownership whether of the state or otherwise." 4
The court's adoption of the legal ownership interpretation is a failure to
recognize the important distinction between theory and reality in the
Soviet economy. The court's predilection for the theoretical approach
is at odds with the Act's emphasis on the need for a realistic perception
of the state-enterprise relationship. 5
The court's legal ownership approach found support in a letter ad81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
17 CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS 3 (No. 42) (Nov. 10, 1965).
Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849, 852 (1978).
Berman, Soviet Propertyin Law andinPlan, 96 U. PA. L. REV. 324, 351 (1948).
H.R. REP., supra note 25.
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dressed to the court by Soviet Ambassador A. Dobrynin.

6

Ambassa-

dor Dobrynin stated that Novosti was an agency or instrumentality of
the Soviet state. 7 The court noted that the English Court of Appeal
considered a similar statement nearly conclusive on the question of
TASS' legal status."8 The Volin court did not give its opinion concerning the persuasiveness of Ambassador Dobrynin's letter but apparently relied heavily on it.
Volpin was not the first time Ambassador Dobrynin had appeared
before a United States court to describe the relationship between the
Soviet state and a Soviet legal person. In Prelude Corp. v. U.S.S.R. as
owner of the F/J'Atlantikand other vessels,8 9 a United States federal

marshall attached the assets of Far East Shipping Co., a Soviet legal
person, to obtain jurisdiction over the U.S.S.R. in a tort claim. In conjunction with the Soviet Union's motion to dismiss the writ of attachment, Dobrynin submitted a statement to the District Court asserting
that Far East was not part of the Soviet state.90 The District Court did
86. Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agcy, 443 F. Supp. 849, 854 (1978).
87. The following is the text of Ambassador Dobrynin's letter to the Vopin court:
I, Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United States of America, inform the Court of the following:
On January 9, 1977, Novosti Press Agency ("Novosti") and on January 12,
1977, the Telegraph Agency of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ('Tass")
received notice of a copy of a Summons and Complaint in the Supreme Court of
the State of New York, County of New York, in the above entitled action. On
February 9, 1977, the said action was transferred to the United States Court for the
Southern District of New York. At the time they received notice of the said Summons and Complaint, Novosti was an instrumentality of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Tass was an organ of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and they each have the same status at the present time.
Since all the allegations against Novosti and Tass in the Complaint in this
action are based upon alleged libels and since under international law and the
statutes of the United States a foreign state, its organs, political subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities are immune from the jurisdiction of the Courts of the
United States, and of the States, with respect to any action based upon libel, I
hereby, as the duly accredited representative of my Government in the United
States, claim this immunity on behalf of Novosti and Tass and respectfully request
that the above entitled action be dismissed.
88. Krajina v. The Tass Agency, 2 All E.R. 274 (1949).
89. Prelude Corp. v. U.S.S.R., as owner of F/V Atlantik and other named vessels, Civ.
No. C-71 1123 GBH (N.D. Calif. June 15, 1971). For a discussion of this case, see 13 HAR.
IN-t'L L.. 316 (1972).
90. The following is the text of Ambassador Dobrynin's letter to the Prelude court:
The vessel 'Suleiman Stalsky' belongs to the Far East Steamship Company which
is a legal entity charged with independent responsibility for its obligations. This
Company deals exclusively in transporting cargo on various routes of the Pacific
Ocean, including routes Japan-Canada-the United States. No fishing vessels be-
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not examine the state-entity relationship because it held that the Soviet
Union itself was subject to service of process.
The Ambassador's statements in Vopin and Prelude are contradictory. In Vo/pin, the Ambassador said that the legal person was part of
the state and in Prelude he implied that the legal person was not part of
the state. The differences in the entities' functions-Novosti was a social information organization 9 ' and Far East was a state production
enterpriseg--do not explain the Ambassador's conflicting statements.
Although the entities served different economic purposes, their legal
status was identical. Nor can the inconsistency in Dobrynin's statements be explained by any change in Soviet law during the period between his two representations. The R.S.F.S.R.'s Civil Code 93 presently
holds that legal persons are separate from the government structure.
The Vo/pin opinion did not consider this inexplicable shift in the
Soviet Ambassador's position or its negative effect, due to the apparent
contradiction, on the evidentiary weight given to his statement. The
Prelude statement, though part of the record of an unpublished decision, was available to the Vo/pin court under Rule 44.1 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure94 and had received extensive treatment in two
prominent publications.95 A discussion of the possible reasons for the
court's failure to treat the issue of the Ambassador's contradictory
statements would be conjectural and fruitless but Ambassador
Dobrynin's inconsistent position on Soviet legal persons throws a
shadow on the part of the opinion that relies on his statement.
D.

A Comparison of Edlow and Vo/pin

The Edlow and Va/pin decisions present two clearly different interpretations of the ownership requirement in the Act's definition of "foreign state." The Edlow test examines whether the enterprise fulfills a
governmental function and whether the state controls the enterprise's
long to the Company and it absolutely does not carry on fishing activities either in
the Pacific or in the Atlantic, or in any other place.
The Far East Steamship Company Under Article 13 of the Basic Civil Law of
the USSR and the Union Republics, is not responsible for state debts, while the
state is not responsible for debts of the company.
91. Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agcy, 443 F. Supp. 849, 852 (1978).
92. 13 HARV. INT'L LJ. 316, 317 n.8 (1972).
93. CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN SOVIET FEDERATED SOCIALIST REPUBLIC arts, 24-40.
94. FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1.
95. C. Stratakis, Sovereign Immuniy, Enforceability of Judgments andRelated Matters,
in BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS WITH THE U.S.S.R. 185 (R. Starr ed.) (1975) and 13 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 316 (1972).
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detailed physical operations. The Volin test examines the doctrinal
basis of the state's economy to ascertain the legal owner of the enterprise's assets. Edlow and Volpin are the only district court cases that
analyze the Act's ownership provision and Vopin decided in January
1978 does not cite or discuss Edlow decided in December 1977.
Neither case is on appeal and no appellate court has reviewed a case
under the Act raising the issue of the socialist state's ownership interest
in socialist enterprises.
The principal drawback to the Volpin "legal property owner" test
is that cases applying the standard are not useful in analyzing subsequent fact situations involving different countries. The test focuses on
the ownership relationship as set out in the constitutional and legislative enactments of the particular "foreign state" defendant. This approach does not yield any rules on how to understand the governmententity relationship as it may appear in other countries. For example, an
adjudication based on the Yugoslav Constitution does not have any
applicability to a dispute involving a Bulgarian enterprise because that
enterprise's status would be determined according to Bulgarian law. A
test that requires a separate analysis of each country's economic and
legal system is not undesirable in itself, but American judges are rarely
trained in unraveling the complexities of socialist law. Thus, the second problem created by the Vo/pin test is the difficulty of its application. The Edlow facts present an excellent example of this point. NEK
argued that its assets were social property and not state property, as the
plaintiff suggested. The legal distinctions between social property
"held and used.

. .

for the general social good of all the Yugoslav

' and state-owned property may be confusing and meaningless
people"96
to American judges. Their decisions would ultimately be based on the
property relationships as they appear through a Western prism. To the
extent these judges would be able to apply socialist law properly, the
test would create a third problem in that it would thwart the Act's goal.
The Act's primary objective is to provide United States citizens an opportunity to seek redress for harms attributable to a foreign state's nongovernmental conduct. 97 Strict adherence to constitutional and legislative enactments ignores the often substantial variance between socialist
doctrine and the manner in which the doctrine is applied. If courts in
the United States restrict their decisions to such provisions, they are
96. Edlow Intern. v. Nuklearna Elektrarna KRSKO, 441 F. Supp. 827, 831 (D.D.C.
1977).
97. H.R. REP., supra note 25, at 6-7.

Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review

[Vol. 3

likely to be governed by laws that may be nothing more than lip-service
to ideology.
The Edlow "function-control" approach to defining ownership
under the Act has four positive qualities without any of the lo/lin
test's difficulties. First, the courts have experience in applying the standard. The "function-control" test is similar to the approach used in
domestic sovereign immunity cases and the courts have a number of
Supreme Court decisions98 for guidance in using it. Second, the rules
developed under the "function-control" test are applicable to all countries regardless of the dissimilarities between their respective legal and
economic systems. As illustrated in the Edlow discussion, a number of
factors constitute control and function. The factors themselves are not
unique to the particular country of the case and may be used in subsequent decisions involving all countries. Thus, the test allows for the
development of a case law which will be useful to the courts in the
future. Third, the "function" aspect of the standard maximizes the
availability of legal redress against state tortfeasors. A court that scrutinizes an enterprise's actual function will not characterize a socialist
entity as a governmental organ simply because the case arises in a socialist political context. Thus, the entities are not automatically "foreign states" and possibly beyond the court's subject matter jurisdiction.
Fourth, the "control" part of the test recognizes the importance of
property ownership to the extent ownership affects the independence
and character of the enterprise's operations.
The "function-control" approach is consistent with Congress' intent to apply the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, as expressed
in the Act, to foreign legal persons that are so closely associated with
the state as to be considered its agency or instrumentality. That test is a
workable standard and does not pose any significant problems in its
application. The "legal property owner" test allows foreign legal persons to escape liability for particular torts and commercial obligations
and entails substantial problems in application. On balance, the Ed/ow
court's "function-control" test is preferrable to the V'o/pin court's "legal
property owner" standard in determining a socialist state's ownership
interest in a socialist enterprise under the terms of the Act.
98. United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807 (1976); Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521
(1973).
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SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE ORGANIZATIONS: ARE
THEY STATE "AGENCIES OR
INSTRUMENTALITIES"?

The Soviet Union conducts foreign trade transactions through a
large number of legal persons, commonly known as foreign trade organizations (FTOs).9 9 The determination of whether an FTO falls within
the terms of the Act has practical significance for the plaintiff and the
FTO defendant. In federal court, the plaintiff must affirmatively allege
the court's subject matter jurisdiction. °° If the plaintiff relies on the
Act for jurisdiction, he must show that the FTO is within the definition
of "foreign state." The court will dismiss the complaint if he fails to do
SO.
If an FTO defendant wishes to assert a claim of sovereign immunity, it must invoke the Act's protections. Before the court can adjudicate the validity of the claim, it must determine whether the FTO is a
"foreign state." If the FTO fails to bring itself within that term, the
court will reject its claim without considering the claim's merits. The
FTO defendant can also directly challenge the plaintiff's jurisdictional
allegation by arguing that it is not a "foreign state." In such a case, the
court must conduct an inquiry similar to the one necessary in a claim of
immunity.
A. The Soviet Foreign Trade Monopoly and the Role of the FTO
The Soviet Union conducts foreign trade on the basis of an AllUnion government monopoly. 01' The scope of the monopoly extends
to international trade in all material goods, international trade aspects
of currency, insurance and freight operations, and international exchanges of scientific-technical achievements. 02 The foreign trade monopoly is an integral part of the socialist economic system. Professor V.
Pozdniakov,10 3 an expert on Soviet foreign trade, has underscored the
99. Approximately sixty FTO's currently are operating. Berman & Bustin, The Soviet
System ofForeign Trade, in Busn'EsS TRANSACTIONS WITH THE U.S.S.R. 30 (R. Starr ed.
1975), J. QUIGLEY, THE SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE MONOPOLY: INSTITUTIONS AND LAWS 105
(1974).
100. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
101. KONSTrrUTSIIA (Constitution) art. 73(10) (U.S.S.R.).
102. V. POZDNIAKOV, SOVETSKOE GOSUDARSTVO I VNESHNIAYA TORQOVLYA-PRAVOVIF.

VoPROSn 32 (1976).
103. V. Pozdniakov, Professor, Doctor of Sciences, Chairman of the Department of Legal Studies, All-Union Academy of Foreign Trade; President, Foreign Trade Arbitration
Commission, U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce and Industry. U.S. Department of Corn-

Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review

[Vol. 3

monopoly's importance in his identification of its three salient functions:
1. The foreign trade monopoly guarantees the interests of the
All-Union government and the various institutions and organizations involved with foreign trade.
2. The foreign trade monopoly serves as a defense of the socialist
economy from foreign economic expansionism and insures the
independent development of the planned economies of the
U.S.S.R. and of the planned character of its foreign trade.
3. The foreign trade monopoly provides for the creation of governmental
trade policy in accordance with Soviet foreign pol4
icy.1
Despite the monopoly's importance in Soviet economics and politics, Soviet legal scholars have avoided, for the most part, a detailed
analysis of the monopoly's relationship to the governmental bureaucracy and the mechanics of exploiting such a vast monopoly. Professor
Pozdniakov's Export-Import Operations'°5 is an attempt to bridge that
informational gap by discussing the roles of the Council of Ministers
and the Ministry of Foreign Trade in the foreign trade monopoly, the
process of developing a foreign trade plan, and the operations of an
FTO. This information is valuable in determining the Soviet Union's
ownership interest in an FTO because it explains the extent to which
the FTO exercises a governmental function and the degree of state control exerted over the FTO.
The Ministry of Foreign Trade (MFT) is the ministry charged with
the responsibility for exercising the foreign trade monopoly. In the
early decades of the foreign trade monopoly, the MFT was the only
ministry involved in foreign trade matters.10 6 As trade procedures were
reformed and liberalized, the MFT began to lose it pre-eminent position. Today, several ministries participate in foreign trade transactions, 07 but the MFT continues to dominate the other bureaucracies as
the final supervisory and regulatory authority on foreign trade. 0 8
merce, American Soviet Trade: A Joint Seminar on the Organizational and Legal Aspects
VIII (Dec. 1975).
104. V. POZDNIAKOV, supra note 102, at 32.
105.

V. POZDNIAKOV, EKSPORTNO-IMPORTNYE OPERATSII-PRAVOVOYE REOULIROVANIIS

(1970).
106. J. QUIGLEY, supra note 99, at 76-77.
107. Six FTOs are subordinate to the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations
and six FTO's are subordinate to agencies primarily concerned with the domestic economy.
.d. at 105.
108. S. PISAR, supra note 36, at 150.
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The MFT formulates trade policy and plans, negotiates diplomatic
agreements on foreign trade, conducts market research, licenses organizations to conduct foreign trade and promotes efficiency in the licensed
organizations. 10 9 The MFT executes these functions through an organization which is divided into two parts. The first part consists of trade
policy departments specializing in geographic areas. The second part
includes operational branches that deal with specific imports and exports.' 10 The MFT supervises this organization through an administration consisting of a chairman, deputy chairman and a collegium.II
2
The chairman is a member of the All-Union Council of Ministers,"
113
which exercises general supervisory control over the M-T.
As noted above, the MFT licenses FTOs to engage in foreign
trade. FTOs conduct 90 percent of all Soviet foreign commerce, and
only in rare instances is the Soviet state a party to commercial transactions." 4 The FTO operates as an intermediary between foreign customers and domestic production enterprises." 5 In export transactions,
in import transactions, the
the FTO is an agent of the Soviet producer, 16
FTO is a principal to the trade agreement."
The All-Union Council of Ministers creates an FTO on the recommendation of the Minister of Foreign Trade." 7 Upon formation of the
FTO, the MFT issues an administrative order granting it a charter.",
The charter enables the FTO to legally engage in foreign trade."19 The
MFT publishes the charter 20 in Foreign Trade, the Ministry's official
magazine, 2in order to notify the world trading community of the FTO's
existence.' '
The FTO becomes a legal person, separate from the state bureauJ. WILCZYNSKI, SOCIALIST ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND REFoRMs 271 (1972).
S. PISAR, supra note 36, at 143.
R. STARR, BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS WITH THE U.S.S.R. 422 (1975).
KONSTITUTSIIA (Constitution) art. 129 (U.S.S.R.).
Id. at art. 131(6).
114. J. QUIGLEY, supra note 99; C. Stratakis, Sovereign Immunity Enforceabili0'ofJudg109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

ments and Related Matters, in BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS WITH THE U.S.S.R. 190 (R. Starr
ed. 1975).
115. S. PISAR, supra note 36, at 148.
116. V. POZDNIAKOV, EKSPORTNO-IMPORTNYE OPERATSII-PRAvovoYE REaOLIROVANIE

(1970).
117. L QUIGLEY, supra note 99, at 111.
118. Berman and Bustin, supra note 99, at 33.
119. Hazard, Soviet Government Corporations,41 MICH. L. REV. 850, 857 (1943).
120. Publication of an FTO's charter is required by statute. Decree of Feb. 10, 1931 in
SOBRANIE ZAKAZANIE, SSSR, no. 8, art. 94 (1931).
121. J. QUIGLEY, supra note 99, at 123 n.65.
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cracy, upon receipt of its charter.'22 The R.S.F.S.R. Civil Code defines
a legal person by listing its attributes. 123 A legal person has its own
name, operates on the basis of economic accountability, may acquire
property rights in its own name, and possesses the capacity to have civil
rights and obligations within the scope of its authorized activities. An
FTO, possessing these qualities, is a "separate legal person" under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act's definition of "agency or instrumentality" of baforeign state. 124
B. State Ownership: The "Function-Control" Test
Application of the "function" aspect of the "function-control" test
requires an analysis as to whether the FTO's function can be characterized as governmental. This issue illustrates the dichotomy between Soviet and American legal and political concepts. The foreign trade
monopoly is an essential element of the Soviet system. Thus the FTO,
as an instrument of the monopoly, exercises a uniquely governmental
function. In contrast, American foreign trade could be characterized as
an activity primarily engaged in by private interests. The Soviet view
of the FTO's "function" would be that the FTOs serve a governmental
function; 25 the American view would be that they fulfill a private function. The Edlow court's standard for characterizing the function of a
socialist legal person is whether its function, in the United States, is
fulfilled by private or governmental interests. Under the Edlow test,
the Soviet FTO does not serve a governmental function.
The FTO is separate from the state bureaucracy but is not independent of it. The state's power over the FTO's operations is decisive in determining whether the state controls the FTO. If the state's
influence amounts to control of the FTO's detailed physical performance, the FTO is under its "control" as defined by the "function-control" test.
The FTO is the administrative subordinate of the MFT1 26 As a
result of this relationship, the MFT exercises authority over the FTO in
three important areas. First, the MFT controls the FTO through its
charter. The FTO's charter is similar in content to a United States corporation's articles of incorporation. The charter sets out the FTO's
122. Hazard, supra note 119.
123. CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN SOVIET FEDERATED SOCIALIST REPUBLIC arts. 24-40.
124. See text accompanying note 58 for definition of "agency or instrumentality."
125. V. POZDNIAKOV, EKSPORTNO-IMPORTNYE OPERATSII-PRAVOVOYE RoULIAROVANIE (1970).
126. S. PISAR, supra note 36, at 148.
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name, the FTO's authority to engage in the foreign trade of specified
products and services and the amount of the FTO's authorized capital. 27 The charter provisions are important in analyzing the significance of state control because they are the first state controls imposed
on the FTO during its existence. 28
The MFT, in addition to its power to create an FTO, has the authority to revoke the FTO's charter with the approval of the Council of
Ministers. 2 9 Revocation of an FTO's charter renders it legally incapable of engaging in trade.
Second, state control over the FTO is manifested in the trade goals
contained in the five-year foreign trade plan. This plan is one of the
most important of a number of smaller economic plans which constitute an All-Union scheme. 3 ' The extent to which the FTO participates
in the formulation of the trade plan is indicative of the degree of state
control over the FTO's operation because the FTO is legally obligated
to fulfill its portion of the plan.
The first step in the planning process' 3' is taken by the State Planning Committee (Gosplan) of the USSR Council of Ministers. Gosplan establishes planned goals for the foreign trade system based on an
integrated schedule of the nation's production and consumption levels.
Gosplan submits the planned goals to a number of ministries, including
the Ministry of Foreign Trade,
and it creates annual "control figures"
32
responses.
their
based on
On the basis of the "control figures," Gosplan and all ministries
involved in foreign trade create detailed annual plans. The detailed
annual plans are composed of a foreign exchange plan, a technical
assistance plan and a plan of export and import of goods. The FTOs
participate in the development of the export-import component. The
annual plans of export and import by countries are drafted initially by
the FTOs. Each FTO prepares a draft plan of export and import of
127. Id.
128. Berman and Bustin, supra note 99, at 33.
129. S. PISAR, supra note 36, at 263.
130. Other forms of control over the FTO organization include the power of the MFT to
appoint the FTO's chairman and deputy chairman. Political considerations enter into these
appointments but there is evidence which indicates that these decisions are increasingly
based on the candidate's managerial qualifications. J. WILCZYNSKI, supra note 109, at 67.
131. Berman and Bustin, supra note 99, at 60. The description of the planning process is
based on the information in this source, unless otherwise stated.
132. Throughout the planning process, specialized departments of the Communist party
work in unison with the state bureaucracies engaged in the formulation of foreign trade
policy. The governmental bodies are responsive to the Party's recommendations for changes
in the plan. Id. at 26-27.
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those types of goods over which it has jurisdiction, taking into account
the annual and perspective plans of the national economy as a whole,
trade agreements between the USSR and other countries, and individual decrees of state agencies concerning foreign economic relations of
the USSR, as well as traditional Soviet imports from and exports to
countries with which the USSR does not have a trade agreement calling for exchanges of specific goods. The draft plans of the FTOs are
reviewed by the branch administrations of the Ministry of Foreign
Trade, which make whatever changes they consider desirable and then
forward the drafts to the commercial policy administrations of the Ministry. After correction by the commercial policy administrations, the
drafts are coordinated within the Ministry by the planning and economic administration. Finally, the Minister and his Collegium send
the coordinated draft to Gosplan, which makes its corrections and then
works out the final draft "with the particip'tion of " or "jointly with"
the Ministry of Foreign Trade-phrases which in Soviet legal parlance
indicate that the leading role is taken by Gosplan. The final draft is
submitted-usually in the middle of the year before it is to take effectto the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Upon conformation by the
Council of Ministers the plan acquires the force of law, although it
remains subject to modifications at any time.
The MFT ensures the FTO's attainment of the "control figures"
through a combination of administrative orders and incentives. On the
basis of the figures, the Department of Planning and Economics of the
MFT sets mandatory export-import targets, control procedures and foreign exchange guidelines for each FTO. 133 The MFT uses material incentives and disincentives to regulate the quantity and price of goods
traded, operating expenses, inventory, selection of customer countries
and utilization of transport facilities.' 34 The final decisions in these areas are the result of coordinated planning between the MFT and the
FTO.

135

Third, state control over the FTO is manifested in the FTO's execution of its assignment under the five-year trade plan. FTO managers
have complete authority, within the guidelines set by the plan and the
MFT, over the trading entities. 3 6 Managerial initiative is increasingly
133. S. PIsAR, supra note 36, at 156. For a more detailed list of mandatory guidelines set
by an FTO's superior agencies, see Maggs, Soviet CorporationLaw. The New Statute Oit the
Socialist ProductionEnterprise, 14 AMERICAN J. OF COMP. LAW 478, 486 (1965).
134. S. PISAR, supra note 36, at 156.
135. Id. at 157.
136. Hazard, supra note 119, at 871.
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recognized as a positive quality.'37 Indeed, the manager's independence has become institutionalized. First, the FTO charter, amendable
only by the MFT and the Council of Ministers, offers substantial protection against local interference in the enterprise's operations ."3 Second, a 1965 statute139 provides that an enterprise's superior agency
should respect the subordinate's rights. Third, the system of "business
accountability" gives the Soviet manager a great deal of authority over
his enterprise's internal structure and the terms upon which the FTO
deals with its foreign customers."4
The Soviet manager has the means to utilize his independence beyond the amount of capital contributed by the state. The FTO retains a
percentage of its profits and transfers the balance to the state treasury.' 4 1 Additional sources of revenue for the FTO are depreciation allowances, bank interest and proceeds from inter-enterprise sales of
basic assets.' 2 Accumulated funds are an important source of investment finance and enable the FTO to trade beyond the restrictions imposed 3by the national balance of payments and the foreign trade
plan.

14

The manager's independence is a compromise between the centralizing tendencies of a monopoly operation and the decentralization required by the flux of international markets combined with the need for
a more efficient and responsible domestic economy. The reforms which
have given the socialist manager more flexibility in the control of his
enterprise have not done away with centralization of the economy. In
137. J. WILCZYNSKI, supra note 109, ai 48-49.
138. Maggs, supra note 133, at 482.
139. Supra note 82.
140. Business accountability (Khozraschet) is a term used to describe a system by which
socialistic governments supervise subordinate enterprises. The system evaluates the enterprise's operational success by measuring the enterprises profitability. Profitability is determined on the basis of a yearly statement filed with the Ministry of Finance and the State
Bank. If the enterprise fails to fulfill its anticipated profit goals, the government will inspect
the enterprise's operations for any functional problems. If the enterprise attains its projected
earnings, the enterprise manager is free to carry on his operations as he sees fit, within the
confines of the plan and statutes. Thus, business accountability is characterized by managerial independence in utilization of enterprise property and the enterprise's operations.
Berman, CommercialContractsin Soviet Law, 35 CAuF. L. REv. 191, 195-96 (1947); Hazard,
supra note 119, at 865-66; J. WILCZYNSKI, supra note 109, at 282-83.
141. J. WILCZYNSKI, supra note 109, at 282-83.
142. The enterprises in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland make
use of the funds to a greater extent than do the enterprises in other East European socialist
countries. Id. at 160.
143. Id.
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the future, however, increased liberalization and concomitant increases
in managerial freedom will be the rule rather than the exception.
The Act defines a "foreign state" as a separate legal person, a majority ownership interest of which is held by the political state, and
which is not a United States citizen. FTOs are chartered in the Soviet
Union and are Soviet citizens. The issue of separate legal personality is
settled by the law of the chartering state. Soviet law clearly provides
that FTOs are legal persons separate from the state. State ownership of
the FTO should be determined by first, whether the FTO fulfills a governmental function and, second, whether the state exerts sufficient control over the enterprise as to regulate its daily activities. Since
American foreign trade is characteristically conducted by private interests, an FTO's function is not a governmental function.
The Soviet governmental bureaucracies that deal with the FTO
have an important voice in the FTO's method of operations. Their influence does not, however, extend to the detailed physical control required to satisfy the "function-control" test. Their regulations are
comparable to the Federal control in Orleans in that the Soviet state
controls the FTO's annual goals but does not control the details of how
it achieves them. In the absence of control over the FTO's day-to-day
activities, the state-enterprise relationship does not satisfy the "control"
aspect of the Edlow "function-control" test.
Foreign Trade Organizations are neither controlled by the Soviet
Government nor do they engage in governmental functions. They are
not "foreign states" under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and,
thereby, are not entitled to the protection of sovereign immunity.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is a codification of one of
the oldest principles in international law. Under the Act, a foreign
state is immune from prosecution for certain actions and this immunity
extends to legal entities that are owned by the political state. The Act
does not define ownership and leaves this term open to judicial interpretation. In the context of entities created by socialist governments,
the definition of ownership is particularly troublesome because of basic
differences between the socialist and United States conceptions of property ownership.
The problems surrounding the definition of ownership may be resolved in one of two ways. First, the United States and the Soviet
Union could resolve the question through the treaty process. To date,
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this approach has not yielded any results. 44 Second, the definition of
the term may be left to the judicial process. The Federal Court in the
Southern District of New York has avoided the intricacies of socialist
law in this area and has established a rule whereby ownership is determined by. the degree of governmental control over the entity and the
entity's function. This rule raises certain problems in its application,
however, it is the most reasonable approach expressed to date, and
should be used by other District Courts in future sovereign immunity
cases.

144. The Soviet Union and United States have attempted to solve the problem of sovereign immunity for FTOs through the treaty process. On October 18, 1972, the two countries
signed a Trade Agreement that statedForeign trade organizations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall not
claim or enjoy in the United States of America... immunities from suit or execution of judgment or other liability with respect to commercial transactions.
Trade Agreement, Oct. 18, 1972, United States-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, art. VI,
2, 67 DEP'T STATE BULL. 597.
The Trade Agreement provided that it would enter into force upon the exchange of
written notices of acceptance. To date, the notices of acceptance have not been exchanged.
The United States Government is unlikely to accept the Agreement until Soviet emigration
policies are liberalized. Thus, Soviet FTOs are free to claim sovereign immunity in United
States courts. The success of their claims will continue to be subject to the uncertainties of
the litigation process.

